

THE COLONIAL IDENTITY OF WINE: THE *LEAKEY AFFAIR* AND THE FRANCO- ALGERIAN ORDER OF THINGS¹

JOHN STRACHAN

Abstract. This article focuses on the 1905 crisis of French and Algerian viticulture that came to be known as the “Leakey Affair.” It explains why metropolitan French observers reacted so strongly to Leakey’s contract and subsequent advertising of Algerian wine on the British market, first from a socio-economic perspective, and second by reference to the importance of wine in French culture and identity. The final section of the article explains the response of Algeria’s colonists to their metropolitan critics. Throughout, wine is used as a prism through which to explore the nature of identity in modern France and the complex colonial relationship in which the wine industry played such a major role. The Leakey Affair revealed the fragility of colonial cultural formations and the importance of wine as a conduit of ideas, and a symbol for fierce wrangling over identity, belonging, and the nature of empire. What was at stake was no less than the intellectual ownership of a mainstay of France’s cultural mythology – wine – and the relationship between an imperial power and its colonial world.

In the autumn of 1905 the fabric of the French Empire was furrowed by a peculiar crisis over the marketing of wine. The immediate cause was a relatively minor piece of business between a London-based liquor merchant, James Leakey, and the French governor general of Algeria, Charles Jonnart. The “Leakey Affair,” as it came to be known, would cast light on the remarkable and complex relationship between metropolitan France and the *colons* (colonists) of European Algeria. The *colons* were painfully aware of the disdain with which they were regarded by many metropolitan observers. In the wine industry, Algerian *vignerons* (wine-growers) sought to establish a reputation for their wares that began to encroach upon what was perceived on the northern shores of the Mediterranean as the “divine right” of metropolitan viticulture. But this had wider implications for France’s imperial undertaking. Recent studies have emphasised the importance of alcohol as an emblem of broader cultural and economic issues in national and imperial politics.² To the French, wine in particular is a polyvalent substance. Beyond its inherent cultural capital, wine can evoke specific passions of politics and identity. Between France and Algeria, it worked as a conduit of ideas, and a symbol for often fierce wrangling over identity, belonging, and the nature of empire.

John Strachan is a Lecturer in History at Lancaster University.

SHAD (Spring 2007):118-137

The issues were made all the more labyrinthine by Algeria's curious status as a quasi-autonomous colony that nevertheless operated within the cultural, economic and political orbit of metropolitan France.

This article uses the Leakey Affair as a microcosm through which to explore the emblematic quality, or the "uses," of wine in the cultural politics of an imperial relationship. It is a worthy starting point, for, as Natalie Zemon Davis suggests, "a remarkable dispute can sometimes uncover motivations and values that are lost in the welter of the everyday."³ The remainder of the article begins with a brief account of the events that would come to be known as the Leakey Affair. It does not offer anything like a comprehensive history of the Algerian wine industry.⁴ Rather, it aims to establish just what was at stake here, first for Leakey's metropolitan critics, and subsequently from the closely related (if opposing) perspective of the Algerian *colon-vignerons*.

In July 1905, Jonnart rewarded Leakey with a contract that allowed him to publicize Algerian wine on the British market. The contract was worth 5,000 francs (FF), spread over five semesters, and depended upon the sale of at least 10,000 hectolitres per semester on the British market. Leakey soon set to work, taking out advertisements in *The Times* (of London), and in *Ridley's Wine and Spirit Trade Circular*. His advertising proudly announced that "we have been honoured by the French government with a subsidy," and reminded readers that "Algeria is now an integral part of France, so that Algerian wines are legally French wines." Leakey offered three principal varieties of Algerian wine – "Médoc type, resembling Palus," "soft, St. Emilion type," and "Big Burgundy type." He also stated, incorrectly, that Bordeaux was the major recipient of Algerian wine exports.⁵

The furor that Leakey's advertising was about to provoke could scarcely have been anticipated. The following month, the Union of Bordeaux Wine Traders brought the advertisements to the attention of their local *Chambre de Commerce*, which in turn addressed a complaint to the Ministry of Commerce. Complaints were received by other *chambres de commerce* across the Midi.⁶ The Bordeaux *vignerons* were particularly incensed at what they saw as an overt attempt to buy in on the good reputation of their own viticulture.⁷ The governor general's response to the Ministry of Commerce, and to two *députés* from the Gironde, André Ballande and Charles Chaumet, who had become embroiled in the affair on the side of the Bordeaux *vignerons*, demonstrated an eagerness to distance the Algerian administration from accusations of false advertising.⁸ Jonnart defended the principle of the contract, but prevailed on Leakey to publish retractions of the errors in subsequent issues of *The Times* and *Ridley's*. His actions, he argued, were part of a broader economic strategy of promoting Algerian produce at trade exhibitions throughout the world.⁹

Ballande and Chaumet were unappeased by the Governor General's diplomatic response. Capitalizing on the discontent of the Midi *vignerons* and traders, they seem to have revelled in the opportunity to make a *cause célèbre* of the Leakey-Jonnart contract. On November 16, 1905, the two *dépu-*

tés launched a lengthy parliamentary interpellation of the Governor General. *Députés* from the traditional wine-growing regions complained that Russian restaurants were now selling wine from the Caucases as “Champagne” or “Bordeaux,” with “Caucases” added to the label in small print, as an afterthought. Though the National Assembly could do little to curb such activities in Russia, Algeria and its Governor General operated under the sovereignty of the French Republic.¹⁰

In Algeria, the colonial press responded to the Leakey Affair with even greater verve than had Ballande and Chaumet. The interpellation of Jonnart in Paris ran as front-page news for several days. The *Dépêche Algérienne* congratulated Jonnart in no uncertain terms for his considerable efforts to popularize and market Algerian produce. This, the editorial argued, was precisely what was needed at a time of overproduction in metropolitan France. The *Dépêche* applauded the principle of the subsidy, and cited a number of newspapers that had been quick to rally to Jonnart’s defence.¹¹ The *Journal Général de l’Algérie*, the organ of commercial opinion, was particularly scathing of Leakey and Jonnart’s metropolitan critics. On November 21, 1905, five days after the interpellation, it spoke of the “unjustifiable jealousy” of the Bordeaux *vignerons*, reminding them that Leakey’s advertising had clearly and proudly identified the wine in question as “Algerian.” Bordeaux, it suggested, wanted to disrupt the export of Algerian wine, and the Leakey Affair was just the latest in a sustained campaign by metropolitan interests against the Algerian *vignerons*. Beyond the invective of the newspaper columns, Algeria’s mayors and municipal councils rallied to Jonnart too. The Governor General received correspondence from a number of Algeria’s wine merchants, asking how they could best profit from Leakey-style contracts. Mayor Darricarrère of Novi reported that *colons* had spontaneously gathered at the town hall in solidarity with their Governor General. There, thirty-nine of their number voted a subscription of 100 FF to encourage and assist Jonnart in extending his policy of merchant subsidies.¹²

Our efforts to make sense of the Leakey Affair should begin at least forty years earlier, in metropolitan France, at a time when Algerian wine production was essentially a cottage industry, dominated by indigenous Algerians and a few entrepreneurial *colons*. By contrast, the wine industry in France, though still centred on regional consumption, was firmly established as a major source of revenue and employment. In the nineteenth century, the advent of steam power and improved road, rail and communications networks were opening up new possibilities for trade and marketing. And it was at this juncture that the curious sparkling white wine of the Champagne region began to be represented as a marker of national identity.¹³

Crisis struck the wine industry in the late 1860s, though not without some warning. A decade earlier French vines were attacked by *oidium* fungus that had proved relatively easy to destroy by means of sulphur treatment. Then, in

1865, vines began to die in parts of the Gard and the Vaucluse. The new blight spread swiftly down the Rhône valley in the early 1870s and was soon identified as Phylloxera, a yellow aphid or plant louse that attached itself to the roots of the vine, sucking out the sap.¹⁴ The context and after-effects of the ensuing Phylloxera epidemic are crucial to our understanding of how the Leakey Affair played out on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Leo Loubère has remarked on the irony of the origins of Phylloxera, which was brought to France from America by means of the same transportation revolution that had enabled the golden age of French wine.¹⁵ Though national production figures remained remarkably resilient throughout the 1870s, the devastation was soon universal. Production reduced by an average of almost thirty million hectolitres per year between 1880 and 1890.¹⁶ Gaston Roupnel identified the Phylloxera crisis as the most important event of the Third Republic.¹⁷ Loubère describes it in similar terms as a subterranean (and ultimately far more costly) equivalent of the devastation wrought by the Franco-Prussian War.¹⁸

Part of the problem was the lack of consensus over how best to fight Phylloxera. Opinion was divided between three principal solutions: the flooding and submersion of the vineyard; chemical treatment with carbon bisulphide or sulphocarbonate; and the grafting of French vines onto hardier, Phylloxera-resistant American roots. Each of the solutions posed considerable problems. Flooding was commonly ineffective. So too was the use of chemicals, which could easily kill the vines if improperly administered. Grafting was perhaps the most expensive of the three, and was commonly thought to jeopardize the quality and taste, not to mention the “Frenchness,” of the product. “Sulphurists” and “Americanists” waged propaganda war within the industry and in the wider press.¹⁹ Slowly and fittingly, however, the necessity of grafting was accepted by the majority. Many small-scale and independent *vignerons* who could afford neither chemicals nor American roots were forced to sell up, or to swell the ranks of the burgeoning co-operative movement.

The prohibitive cost and slow acceptance of grafting substantially reduced production levels for at least fifteen years beginning in the late 1870s. Demand and prices soared. And it was in this context of metropolitan crisis that the governor general of Algeria, Antoine Chanzy, began to advocate the expansion of Algeria’s wine industry, as yet untouched by Phylloxera.²⁰ For two decades thereafter, colonial Algeria flourished on the revenue of wine exports that enjoyed a privileged place as the “saviour” of French viticulture. They became commonplace in France, both in their own right, and for use in the legally ambiguous process of *coupage* (blending) with metropolitan wines that would proceed largely unchecked until the introduction of the *appellation d’origine contrôlée* (protected designation of origin) system in the 1930s.

Late nineteenth-century Algerian wine did not share the reputation of more established regions like Champagne and Bordeaux that were marketed as superior to the mass-produced, cheap *ordinaire* (ordinary, low quality wine), the

consumption of which had flourished with the onset of working-class urban culture.²¹ Though Algerian wine would establish a distinct reputation in the mid twentieth century,²² its early days were tarnished by a distinction, often crude, between refined, “agricultural” wines like Champagne and Bordeaux, and the dangers of mass-produced, harder “industrial alcohol,” which often included cheap, blended wine.²³

The methods and outlook of the Pastorian laboratory now began to permeate French society, as Bruno Latour has convincingly demonstrated. With them, the new vocabulary of technologies of testing facilitated the characterisation of cheap wine as inferior, “industrial” produce.²⁴ In this context, Algerian wine was sought after not for its quality but for its high alcohol content – thirteen or fourteen percent as opposed to nine or ten percent for cheaper metropolitan wines. Throughout the Phylloxera years, the rich, dark wine of Algeria, Spain and Italy was prized as the best means to bolster the weaker and Phylloxera-ravaged produce of the Midi.²⁵ Only with the renaissance of the metropolitan industry in the mid 1890s was “foreign” wine recast as the competitor and usurper of French wine. This would be the prevailing view at the time of the Leakey Affair.

Algerian competition was just one of many challenges that faced the recovery of the metropolitan industry in the late 1890s and early 1900s. In the Midi, the recovery took the form of a “march to the hills” whereby *vignerons* sought to make up for their losses to Phylloxera by planting masses of high-yield grape varieties in previously unplanted areas.²⁶ Production from the new grafted vines soon surpassed pre-Phylloxera levels and outstripped demand, with cheap Algerian wine continuing to flood the market. “*Mévente*” was the generic term employed to describe overproduction, poor sales and bleak prospects for the industry. *Vignerons* bankruptcies proliferated. Many were obliged to reinvent themselves as proletarian wage earners, often working as cellarmen in large-scale, capital-intensive enterprises. This coincided with a general downturn in industrial wages around 1904-05 that further depressed the urban market for cheap ordinaire.²⁷ Many of the surviving Midi *vignerons* were now forced to dump their unsold harvests.

The focus of their discontent was often the glut of Algerian exports, but more often took the form of a generalized attack on “fraudulent” wine (discussed below). Calcium carbonate was commonly employed by *vignerons* to reduce the acidity of the harvest in years of inclement weather, when insufficient sunlight had produced unripe grapes. Retailers were also known to water down their supply to offset poor sales. Worst of all, perhaps, was the process of *chaptalisation* (sugaring), whereby *vignerons* would extract two or more batches of wine from the same “cake” of grapes by adding sugar to boost fermentation. A whole raft of legislation, dating from the pre-Revolutionary era to the Griffe Law of 1889, had been intended to control sugaring, but often went unenforced.²⁸

The discourse of *mévente*, and of fraud, was liberally employed by the oppo-

nents of the Leakey contract. As early as 1887, Midi *vignerons* had demanded stricter controls on the import of “foreign” wine, and a change in the nature of the relationship between France and Algeria so that the wine exported by the latter could now be treated as “foreign.”²⁹ At the time of the *révolte du Midi*, however, the discontent of *vignerons* focused on another major cause of the *mévente* – northern sugar-beet growers who were commonly held to be in league with the government of Georges Clemenceau. Violent protests erupted across the Midi between 1905 and 1907, where *vignerons* rallied around the Argeliers café owner Marcelin Albert and the socialist mayor of Narbonne, Ernest Ferroul. Troops sent by Clemenceau to quell the insurrection mutinied in favor of the protestors. Government belatedly responded with new laws designed to limit imports and severely restrict the use of sugar in the production process. Algerian production started to tail off,³⁰ and by 1908, the wine industry in metropolitan France had begun a slow recovery.³¹

What is striking about the *révolte du Midi*, occurring so soon after the Leakey Affair, was the scarcity of reference to Algerian competition as a source of discontent. Rather, the Midi protests usually took the form of a regionalist-syndicalist movement directed against the Clemenceau government, northern meddling, and the big capital that had come to dominate the wine industry in the immediate post-Phylloxera years. The *Confédération Générale du Travail* union was now a powerful force in the Midi, and growing numbers of the surviving small *vignerons* formed co-operative associations to insulate themselves from the cost of recovery.³² Many of these socio-economic developments were mirrored in Algeria, where some of the equally demoralized colonial *vignerons* had declared their solidarity with the men of the Midi (discussed below).

Economic hardship and the social transformation of the wine industry go some way to account for the uproar generated by Leakey’s advertising. But the arguments of the Midi *chambres de commerce* and the Gironde *députés* took on essentially cultural forms that testified to the ambiguous place of colonial Algeria within the French nation. Food and drink had been an extremely cherished part of the national imaginary since long before the Revolution.³³ Twentieth-century writers like Gaston Bachelard, Roland Barthes and Fernand Braudel were commenting on the cultural capital of wine that was already well-established at the time of the Leakey Affair. In his *Identité de la France*, Braudel suggests that “if wheat is the prose of our long past, then wine is its poetry.”³⁴ Bachelard describes wine as the “blood” of the nation; for Barthes it is the ultimate “totem-drink.”³⁵ The consummate irony of an alcohol that is “good to think” allows, perhaps, for the plasticity that Barthes attributes to the wine myth. He goes on to describe how wine sits well with all the foods in the French culinary cosmos. In cold weather it inspires dreams of summer sun; in the heat of summer it appears cool and refreshing. For the worker, wine enables his *travail*; for the intellectual it represents an escape from the

aridity of professional life and a symbol of virility.³⁶ Pierre Mayol and Michel de Certeau's fascinating study of social mores in the Croix-Rousse district of Lyon has also portrayed wine and bread as powerful markers of class belonging and essential components of the practice of everyday life.³⁷

But such mythologizing of wine can obscure the darker side of its history, much like the mythology of the French nation, as Ernest Renan understood it, entailed the wilful forgetting of uncomfortable moments in national history.³⁸ Perpetuating a national mythology of wine was undoubtedly in the best interest of the *vignerons*. But they had to balance the myth with the lived experience of a difficult and often unrewarding profession, particularly apparent at the time of the Leakey Affair. Gaston Roupnel's classic account of French rural life contains a particularly sober description of the troubles that faced the *vignerons* in our period. Of all the forms of rural activity, he argued, wine-growing was subject to the most violent ravages of climate and disease. He disputed romantic understanding of the complex idea of *terroir* (literally, earth or terrain), claiming that what little success the *vignerons* enjoyed had been the fruit not of the "ungrateful" soil but of their own labors and miseries.³⁹ Lucien Febvre alludes to a similar point in describing the *vigneron* as an "eternal Sisyphus."⁴⁰ Barthes concludes that the mythology of wine is far from innocent. In Algeria, he reminds us, the industry centred on exploitation of indigenous society by the richest "yellow gloved" *colons*. Wine was an exploitative colonial crop *par excellence*, fitting neatly with the commonly held aspiration that saw Algeria as the provider, or "bread-basket," of metropolitan need.⁴¹ It was also, he argued, a drink of which Muslim *indigènes* (indigenous Algerians) had no need, imposed upon them and grown on land of which they had been dispossessed, when they lacked even bread.⁴²

By highlighting the unequal relationship between metropolitan and colonial *vignerons*, the Leakey Affair represented another Algerian challenge to France's romantic mythology of wine. The term "colonial Algeria" is itself something of an oxymoron. In 1848, French legislators had sought to incorporate the colonies within the administrative and lexical framework of the new Republic. Areas of Algeria considered to have been occupied, if not completely pacified, were soon re-conceived as three *départements* on the metropolitan model, centred on Algiers, Oran and Constantine. Political directives were to emanate from Paris, and Algeria was in theory to be administered as three departments of the French Republic like any other. But in 1871, the establishment of a civilian Governor General, subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior in Paris, and in 1900, the granting of a degree of budgetary autonomy, had re-affirmed Algeria's status as a peculiar hybrid – part-colony, part-*département*.

Cultural understandings of the nation, and of wine as a symbol of French national identity, echoed the ambiguity of this political arrangement. Modern historians of empire are quick to criticize the commonplace "hexagonal" definition of France that stops at the northern shores of the Mediterranean,

excluding overseas territories and departments that were, and are, incorporated, however tentatively, within the administrative aegis of the Republic.⁴³ The introduction of compulsory primary schooling after 1881 had hastened the process by which France's regions were brought into the orbit of national culture, language and identity.⁴⁴ Under the Third Republic, the French *patrie* (nation) was described by educators, geographers and historians as a romantic combination of the individual merits of each region or *pays*.⁴⁵ But this understanding was colored by the Jacobin tradition insofar as the national interest was always held to outweigh the regional and the local. The plaintiffs in the Ballande-Chaumet interpellation conceded that Algeria should be accepted as a *pays français*. What Gaston Doumergue objected to, however, was that Leakey's subsidy had been granted from the budget of the Governor General, and therefore from the funds of central government. High functionaries of the Republic, he argued, should not be seen to privilege regional over national interests. For Ballande, Leakey was a prime example of how central funds were being improperly used to benefit one region – Algeria – to the detriment of another – the Gironde.⁴⁶ More often than not, France's colonies were excluded altogether from the Third Republic's notion of *patrie*. There is little room for Algeria in Jules Michelet's "interior chemistry" of the nation, nor in Paul Vidal de la Blache's *tableau*, nor, surprisingly given the time he spent in Algeria, in Braudel's "national bouquet."⁴⁷

Central to the mythology of wine, and to the mentality of the *vigneron*, is the idea of *terroir*. Here too, Algeria appears as the usurper, or at best the junior partner, of metropolitan France. *Terroir* is a nebulous concept that can refer to climate, soil, location, and the soul and aspirations of the peasant-*vigneron*. Together, these factors bestow a unique *terroir* on the wine produced by each region, indeed by each vineyard or *vigneron*. *Terroir* is both natural and eternal.⁴⁸ In Bachelard's imaginary, wine was a "living body," a conjuncture of timeless essences, "the sap of the sun and the earth."⁴⁹ Allied to the universal, however, were the specific attributes of individual *terroirs*. The passing of a comet, he argued, could profoundly affect a harvest.⁵⁰ The discourse of *terroir* under the Third Republic, shaped largely by the work of the historical geographer Vidal de la Blache, was heavily eurocentric and therefore excluded Algeria, in spite of her wine production being dominated by European *colons*. Algerian wine was something of a *parvenu* (newcomer and usurper) amidst the long and venerable history of metropolitan *terroirs*. Roger Dion's major study of the industry pays very little attention to Algeria. Whilst North African wines had enjoyed fame in the sixth century at the court of Constantinople, centuries of Muslim presence thereafter were seen to have eradicated what had once been a "natural vocation."⁵¹ This, of course, was a classic justification for France's "civilising mission" overseas. In practice, however, colonial or French Algeria always retained subordinate status. As Kolleen Guy suggests in a recent essay on *terroir*, the history of wine – and the Leakey Affair, we might add – exposed the fragility of Algeria's incorpo-

ration within the assimilationist framework of the French Republic.⁵²

Metropolitan *vignerons* might be expected to guard the purity of the idea of *terroir* with some voracity. But we should remember that it was specifically the advertising and marketing of Algerian wine, and not its quality, which first provoked the ire of Leakey's critics. A holistic approach to *terroir* that understands marketing as an essential component of the identity of wine may help to elaborate this point.⁵³ As we have seen, the wine industry was originally centred on regional consumption. The improvements in transport that facilitated trade had privileged areas with established trade routes, like Bordeaux. Traditionally only superior quality wines were transported and exported.⁵⁴ These superior wines were the ambassadors of *terroir*, and of the know how of the *vigneron*. They also acted as a conduit of ideas about the nation. Leakey's "false" advertising jeopardized all of this. If inferior wines could be misrepresented as "French," then the meaning and significance of *terroir* would be debased. The economic and social crises of metropolitan wine around 1905 are clearly an important dimension to the Leakey Affair. On balance, however, the immense semantic freight of French wine, which was also under threat, underpinned regional, national and *vigneron* identities, and ultimately the fortunes of the entire industry.

The *colon-vignerons* of Algeria bought into the semantic freight of wine in much the same way as their metropolitan interlocutors. Many were, after all, emigrants from the Midi at the time of Phylloxera. And many of the problems of the metropolitan industry were replicated in Algeria. But the *colons'* support for Leakey, and especially for Governor General Jonnart, was played out with more complexity and drama than was ordinarily the case in such a regional dispute. Understanding just what was at stake in the autumn of 1905, from the point of view of the Algerian *vignerons*, requires an investigation into the peculiar course of the colonial wine industry.

We have established that Algerian wine blossomed into the market space opened up by the Phylloxera epidemic in metropolitan France. Vines had covered 17,000 hectares of colonial Algeria in 1878, rising sharply thereafter to 71,000 hectares in 1885 and 103,000 hectares in 1888.⁵⁵ But this increase was not entirely attributable to the aping of metropolitan techniques. Advanced refrigeration processes that boosted output were actually being pioneered in Algeria. Sir James Blyth commented in *The Times* that European producers would do well to learn the lessons of colonial viticulture.⁵⁶ Building on these advances, wine soon became the major component of the Algerian economy, with large numbers of sailors and coopers working in the slipstream of the trade. At the time of her important 1947 study, Hildebert Isnard estimated that 98 percent of Algeria's annual exports were destined for France, of which wine represented 60 percent.⁵⁷

Nonetheless, the economic foundations of Algerian viticulture were far from solid. Most of the small-scale emigrant *vignerons* had little capital to in-

vest in the land. They were, however, assisted by the favourable tariff policies of metropolitan governments. At the time of Phylloxera, the idea of French Algerian peasants working in the colonies to prevent foreigners from capitalising on the misfortunes of the French *vigneron* appealed to the national interest.⁵⁸ Accordingly, Algerian wine profited from less regulation than the metropolitan industry. Laws of 1884 which brought Algerian agriculture into the orbit of French tariff policy did not initially apply to wine. And the Algerian administration still controlled the all important *octroi de mer*, a duty on the import of wine into Algeria, which had great significance for the process of blending.⁵⁹ This special treatment would all be revisited in the wake of the metropolitan industry's renaissance, when the lenient policies of the 1870s and early 1880s no longer appeared justified. Even so, the Méline Tariff of 1891 that sought to normalize tariff policy by abolishing the *octroi*, now the scourge of metropolitan *vignerons*, left Algeria in a curious hiatus between colonial and departmental status.⁶⁰

More significant, perhaps, than the vicissitudes of tariff policy, was Algerian viticulture's absolute dependence on credit. The system enabled the spread of vines through the state-sponsored *comptoirs d'escompte* (lending banks), organized into *caisses régionales* and *locales* (regional and local branches). State-regulated banks, notably the *Banque de l'Algérie* and the *Crédit Foncier*, also came to play a substantial role in the lives and imaginations of the *colon-vignerons*.⁶¹ With Phylloxera devastating the metropolitan crop, large-scale planting of vines was pushed as a patriotic duty, and loans offered and happily re-extended by the *comptoirs d'escompte*, many of which were run by established *colons*, with little or no concern for the credit status of the *vignerons*. The authoritative work of Charles-Robert Ageron estimates the value of viticultural loans re-extended to have risen from 265 million FF in 1878-79 to 515 million FF in 1881-82.⁶² *Vigneron* debt was fast becoming unsustainable, given the inherent instability of the wine industry, painfully apparent on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. And yet, even after metropolitan recovery from Phylloxera had smashed Algeria's economic fortunes, the culture of agricultural debt continued. Inspired by their newly acquired budgetary autonomy, the *délégations financières* and *Congrès d'Agriculteurs* imposed annual minimums on the lending banks in 1900 and 1901. The number of *caisses locales* rose from ninety-two at the time of the Leakey Affair to 259 eight years later.⁶³

The patriotic duty that encouraged many of these *vignerons* into debt must be offset against the independent and entrepreneurial spirit of the *colons*. Indeed, the shifting balance of these two factors is perhaps the key to understanding the mindset that enabled the Leakey imbroglio. The *vignerons'* reaction to the prospect of Phylloxera reaching Algeria is clear evidence of this. As the small *vignerons* of France began to accept the necessity of grafting in the early 1880s, writers within the Algerian industry protested vigorously against the preferred metropolitan solution. Their discourse played on the theme of

Phylloxera as an American disease that had invaded the mother country and emphasized the “foxy” flavor of wine produced from grafted vines. One writer spoke of the short-lived metropolitan obsession with American vines, suggested that their immunity to Phylloxera remained unproven, and reminded readers in no uncertain terms that American roots had been the cause of Phylloxera in Europe. This text, of 1883, was radically opposed to naïve Parisian legislators almost as much as it was anti-American. The author went so far as to suggest a boycott of grafted vines in Algeria in a plea for reason and patience to prevail.⁶⁴

Phylloxera made a first appearance in Algeria at Tlemcen in 1885. Thereafter, writers linked to the Algerian wine industry continued to promote the efficacy of the chemical solution. Sylvère Le Roux praised the small number of metropolitan *vignerons* who had successfully fought Phylloxera without grafting and gave readers elaborate advice for the large-scale treatment of diseased vines. He tapped into the regionalist vein in *colon* identities, suggested that *vignerons* in metropolitan France and the colder countries were merely jealous of the benign climate and fertile soil of the Algerian coastal plain, and advocated a customs union of the three Algerian *départements* to keep contaminated European and American vines out of North Africa.⁶⁵

Phylloxera was a major contributor to the crisis of Algerian wine, but the *colon-vignerons*' difficulties were multiplied by their indebtedness, and by the recovery of the metropolitan industry, now assisted by grafted vines. It is important to understand this period after 1885 not as one of generalized crisis, but rather as the successive manifestation of a series of related problems. The planting of vines in Algeria continued throughout, reaching its peak well after the Leakey Affair had passed into memory. Phylloxera had reached Tlemcen in 1885, but was far from widespread in the colony. The major problems that year were the poor harvest and the increasing competition of Spanish and Italian wines for the metropolitan French market.⁶⁶ The renaissance of French wine in 1893-94 was again accompanied by a poor harvest in Algeria.⁶⁷ Worst of all, perhaps, was the overproduction and falling prices of the early years of the twentieth century that arguably reached a peak in 1905. This caused the ruin of many small *vignerons*, and a general trend whereby *colons*, out of sheer desperation, sought increasingly to do business with *indigènes*.⁶⁸ New laws restricting the use of sugar in the production process hit the *vignerons* particularly hard. Exports of Algerian-produced *ordinaire* fell from 95 million FF in 1904 to 39 million FF the following year.⁶⁹ Phylloxera, moreover, affected an area of vines three times larger in 1905 than it had been in 1900.⁷⁰

Chief amongst their woes, the *colon-vignerons* felt themselves poorly treated by an ungrateful *mère patrie*. The once flexible tariff policy that governed the export of Algerian wine to France was now tightened, and the harsh laws on sugaring betrayed the commonplace assumption that Algerian wine production was largely fraudulent. The opposition of the Midi *vignerons* to Algeria's privileged *octroi de mer* had indeed been grounded in the belief (often

true) that cheap wines were being imported and blended, and then sold in metropolitan France. By abolishing the *octroi*, the Méline Tariff had firmly subordinated Algeria “to the vicissitudes of the metropolitan market.”⁷¹ In January 1902, the *Syndicat Commercial Algérien* wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, lobbying for the reduction of export duties to Belgium, Russia and Germany. The response from the Ministry to a similar demand the previous year had sympathized, stressing the importance of wine to France and to “our African *départements*.”⁷² Though this language was strictly correct, and commonly used at the time, it nevertheless implied a peculiar understanding of colonial Algeria that was never completely accepting of administrative assimilation.

A similar regard was apparent in the approach of the customs authorities. Complaints to the Ministry of Commerce from *chambres de commerce* in Bordeaux and Carcassonne made much of fraudulent production in Algeria, which was supposedly conducted with a “regrettable impunity.”⁷³ That same year, 1899, H. Langlois, a *vigneron* from the commune of Damiette in western Algeria, had addressed a complaint to the Governor General and to the Director of Customs in Paris. Some of his wine had been intercepted by customs at Nice and, after chemical analysis, was found to contain substantial traces of Spanish grape varieties.⁷⁴ Langlois was not alone. In the summer of 1902, the wine merchant J. Latrille had 178 barrels of Algerian *blanc* confiscated by the authorities in Bordeaux. His purchase had been suspected of having been sugared, but was eventually released to him with the explanation that the natural sweetness of Algerian wines made them susceptible to suspicion.⁷⁵ Algerian *vignerons* retorted that their wines were so similar to certain Spanish and Italian varieties as to make identification almost impossible. Sugaring, they argued, was no less common in metropolitan France, and “scientific” chemical analysis notoriously inaccurate. The extent of these fraudulent practices is very difficult to determine. What appears clear is that the tightening of customs regulations coincided neatly with the overproduction crisis, and the need for market space for the resurgent metropolitan industry.

If Algerian *vignerons* could no longer sell their wares they would soon fall prey to indebtedness. The expansionist culture advocated by both lenders and the colonial press was at the root of spiraling debts. *Plantez, plantez encore* had been the advice of the *Echo d'Oran* in the mid-1890s.⁷⁶ Ageron offers a scathing picture of the irresponsibility of many *colon-vignerons*, who used what little credit they could still obtain to increase production, instead of clearing existing debts. The *Banque de l'Algérie* and *Crédit Foncier* were pushed into repossessing an increasing number of vineyards. The latter was now described as the *Crédit Enfonceur* (a pun on the idea of pushing someone under), and the provision of state compensation widely derided by the *colons*.⁷⁷ The *Société Domaniale Algérienne*, established in 1900 as an offshoot of the *Banque de l'Algérie*, was soon forced into liquidation. One account of the crisis of 1905-06 estimated 30 million FF of losses amongst the smaller

vignerons.⁷⁸ They had been worst affected by the devastation, and many were obliged to go over to wheat cultivation. But the richer, “yellow gloved” *colons* were also victims of the debt culture. Charles Debonno, the “king” of Algerian wine, was a prime example.⁷⁹ The *Banque de l’Algérie* had allowed him to run up huge debts in the heady days of the boom era. The crisis of 1905 finally impeded his repayments to the extent that the bank was obliged to foreclose. When it did, the value of his assets paled in comparison to debts totaling more than eight million FF.⁸⁰

As was the case in metropolitan France, the economic crisis of the Algerian wine industry spawned resentment, but also profound social change. The bankruptcy of many small *colon-vignerons*, exacerbated by the astronomical cost of grafting, and the repossession of much of their land, encouraged the centralization of the industry in the form of large-scale corporate estates. Though the area of Algeria dedicated to wine-growing continued to increase, the number of land-owning *vignerons* fell from 16,000 in 1905 to 11,500 in 1913. In 1887, thirty-two percent of Algerian viticulture had been concentrated in estates of less than ten hectares. Twenty years later, this figure had fallen to just nine percent. In the same period, estates of more than fifty hectares grew from thirty-two to fifty-three percent of the industry total.⁸¹ The term *colon*, implying both agricultural labor and land ownership, now became an inappropriate description for most of those working in the wine industry. The democracy of small proprietors, the idyllic vision of the early Third Republic, appeared increasingly illusory by the time of the Leakey Affair.⁸²

The large workforce required by the newly centralized wine industry was drawn essentially from the *petits blancs*, the poor whites of Algeria. *Indigène* involvement in this period was relatively modest. Some of the *petits blancs* were bankrupted, previously land-owning *vignerons*. Many, however, were new to the trade, or else had already worked on the large estates in a subaltern capacity. This was the case for Lucien Camus. After service in Morocco with the *zouaves* regiment, Camus had worked his way through the wine industry to the relatively senior position of cellarman. He was employed in the Constantine *département* of western Algeria where the centralization of the industry had been particularly intense. Camus lived and worked on the vineyards of Saint-Paul and Chapeau-de-Gendarme (300 and 500 hectares respectively), which were part of the larger Société des Fermes Françaises d’Algérie et de Tunisie. His family life was fairly typical – confined to a cramped two-room house with mud floors located next to the cellar in the center of the vineyard. A good cellarman like Camus earned between ten and twenty FF per day. His tasks included the transport of the barreled wine to the local port of Bône, where it was traded for and on behalf of the Jules Ricôme et Fils company. The inclement weather was a constant source of concern. In 1913, the year Lucien’s second son, Albert, was born, the elder Camus’ troubles included a violent Sirocco wind and “hailstones the size of pigeon eggs.”⁸³ In many ways, Camus was typical of the early twentieth-century Algerian colonist. Not

a land-owning *colon* in the traditional sense, he was especially sensitive to the vicissitudes of agriculture. In 1914, the year of his death on the Western Front, Camus' young family would move to Algiers, swelling the ever-increasing number of urban *petits blancs*. There, the urban print-culture of Algeria's capital city, on which Albert Camus would later thrive, represented another important part of the Leakey story.

The *colon-vignerons'* resounding support for Governor General Jonnart in 1905 and 1906 was made apparent by the colonial press that had flourished in Algiers after the advent of the Third Republic in 1870. Traditionally, the governor general of Algeria had been the commander of the *Armée d'Afrique*. Under the Second Empire, the military came to be resented by the *colons* for their complicity in Napoleon III's ostensibly pro-*indigène* policy of the *royaume arabe* (Arab kingdom). News of the Empire's fall was greeted with jubilation in Algiers, but the new government of September 4, 1870 chose yet another military man as governor general, thereby provoking pro-Republican demonstrations and the declaration of an Algiers commune that demanded the immediate appointment of civilian leadership. Nonetheless, subsequent governors general, Louis-Henri, comte de Gueydon (1871-73) and Chanzy (1873-79), were also senior military officers, though nominally acting in a civilian capacity. The appointment of the first genuinely civilian governor general in 1879 met with great enthusiasm in the *colon* press. But he too fell out of favor. Louis Tirman (governor general 1881-91) lasted ten years in the job only by deferring continually to the will of the powerful *colon* lobby. And he was derided throughout his tenure for allowing the underhand restoration of military influence in government. Jules Cambon (1891-97), another purportedly pro-*indigène* governor general, was also hounded from office by the repeated hostility of the press. The appointment was clearly an unenviable one. After 1870, European Algeria oscillated, sometimes violently, between enthusiasm and outright rejection of the French Republic. In the midst of all this, the governor general occupied the near impossible position of arbiter between metropolitan and *colon* interest. Though Paris might occasionally appear sympathetic to his plight, the insatiable *colons* were rarely so.⁸⁴

Such was the political culture of Algiers when Jonnart became governor general in 1900. The omens for the relationship between the new man and the *colons*, particularly the *vignerons*, were not at all good. Jonnart continued to serve as a *député* for the Pas-de-Calais throughout his Algerian tenure, which may well have called into question his impartiality as an arbiter between colony and metropolitan France. He was, moreover, a close associate of Jules Méline, whose tariff of 1891 had helped dismantle the privileged status of Algerian wine exports.⁸⁵ But Jonnart did enjoy certain advantages. Algeria's partial budgetary autonomy, established in the guise of the *délégations financières* in December 1900, allowed him an unprecedented degree of aloofness from the financial decision-making process. He was experienced in Algerian administration, having served as Chief of Staff to Governor General Tirman,

and yet sufficiently distant from the stereotypical image of the republican functionary. The President of the *Fédération des Sociétés Agricoles du Pas-de-Calais* had commented that the new Governor General possessed a “taste for the earth” that would have endeared him to those *colons* that still espoused the agricultural idyll.⁸⁶ Jonnart’s principal political biographer suggests that he succeeded admirably in the delicate balancing act of maintaining good relations with *indigène* leaders, the *délégations financières*, and the *colon* elite. The latter may well have been impressed by the wine cellar that Jonnart was said to have diligently maintained. He also continued the itinerant habits of his metropolitan political career, traveling regularly to meet with constituents and subordinates.⁸⁷

In commercial affairs, Jonnart seemed keen to promote Algeria in its own right. He had sent trading missions to Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and beyond, encouraging the promotion of colonial produce outside of the metropolitan market. Interested parties like Leakey increasingly solicited the Governor General for trade and publicity contracts.⁸⁸ Jonnart also contributed to the wider prestige of Algeria. In the spring of 1905, he had welcomed Edward VII and the British Fleet to Algiers, an act interpreted in many quarters, and welcomed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, as a strengthening of the *Entente Cordiale*. It was Edward’s influence that would eventually secure Jonnart’s appointment as Vice President of the important *Compagnie de Suez* in 1907.⁸⁹

The wine lobby had another good reason to support the Governor General over the Leakey Affair. The centralization of the industry after Phylloxera and overproduction was a painful, if not always ruinous, experience for the *colon-vignerons*. The one solution that allowed many of the smaller *vignerons* the hope of survival was collectivization. Collective enterprises could effectively pool the resources of their members, thus vastly reducing the cost to the individual of refrigeration, filtration, harvesting and transportation. But this idea had not been tested on any significant scale. Then, in the summer of 1905, at the exactly the time that Leakey began to advertise, the commune of Dupleix became the first in Algeria to establish a co-operative association of *vignerons*. Crucially, the enterprise was said to have the support of Henri de Peyerimhoff, the Governor General’s Director of Agriculture, and of Jonnart himself. The overwhelming majority of *vignerons* in Dupleix joined the association, now supported by a subsidy of 15,000 FF from the Governor General, and the interest, thanks to Jonnart’s intervention, of leading oenologists. The co-operative at Dupleix increased production year on year, and was able to sell its wine above the normal market rate and return a substantial amount to the *vignerons*. By the end of 1908, the Dupleix association had spent 41,500 FF. Of this total, 7,500 FF had been provided by the members, 15,000 FF by the *caisse locale*, and the remaining 19,000 FF by the Governor General. Such extensive subsidies could not be maintained universally, however, and the localities that followed the example of Dupleix did so with mixed success.

Nonetheless, in the summer of 1906, Jonnart announced that individual subsidies would be progressively phased out in favor of subsidies to co-operatives. More important to our understanding of the Leakey Affair is that Jonnart was seen to be personally associated with the co-operative movement, and more generally, to be sympathetic to the plight of the *colon-vignerons*.⁹⁰

Through all of this, James Leakey appears as something of a bewildered actor in the face of the controversy that he had provoked. In 1907, to the annoyance of Jonnart, he ran a further series of advertisements for “Algerian Burgundy,” “Chablis” and “Claret,” and was eventually threatened with the cancellation of his contract.⁹¹ In *The Times* of May 25, he had written, unapologetically, that “Adulteration of wine is unknown in Algeria; the anxiety of the growers is to improve their wine under the advice of Government experts, and to establish a reputation of their own, quite apart from the ancient and well-deserved reputation of Bordeaux.”⁹² These comments suggest at least a cursory grasp of the issues. It seems likely, however, that the enormity of the situation was difficult for an outsider to comprehend. Colonial Algeria was an administrative, economic, and cultural enigma, whose peculiar status depended upon a whole multitude of often unspoken assumptions. The twin crises of modernity and Phylloxera had initially pushed France closer to her “productive” colonies. In the final analysis, however, the Algerian wine industry operated at the behest, if not the whim, of metropolitan need. The hierarchy that distinguished metropolitan France from her colonies would not permit administrative assimilation to extend to economic and cultural equality. The *terroir* of metropolitan wine, broadly conceived as inclusive of marketing, was jealously guarded. The discourse of *mévente*, and the critique of Algerian wine at the time of the Leakey Affair, shows colonial wine to be emblematic of this hierarchy.

For their part, the *colon-vignerons* sought to fashion an identity that innovated and extended, rather than merely replicating the metropolitan model. Ever conscious of the precariousness of their existence, they sought to adapt and refashion metropolitan practices. Jonnart was a particularly good example of this, working effectively as a broker between the *colons* and the interests of business. Ageron describes Algerian *vignerons* in this period as irreligious, often violent, and without the slightest respect for traditional social elites or power structures. Crisis had taught them the means of political intervention and how to command, to act, and to obtain.⁹³ For Isnard, they were an unstable, effervescent, and anarchic body, ill adapted to the peculiar requirements of a new industry and a new way of life.⁹⁴ The “perpetual lottery” that was the colonial wine industry in the early years of the Third Republic had helped fashion the broader mentality of Algeria’s *colons*.⁹⁵ Viticulture had played a huge role in the economy of the colony and the *vignes de papa* (vines of our fathers) would be equally important to the twentieth-century identity of the *pie-d-noir* community and its subsequent, post-independence diaspora.⁹⁶ The Leakey Affair shed light on all of this. What was being wrangled over was

no less than the intellectual ownership of a mainstay of France's cultural mythology – wine – and the foundations of the relationship between an imperial power and its colonial world.

University of Lancaster
j.strachan@lancaster.ac.uk

ENDNOTES

1. The research for this article was conducted at the *Archives nationales, section d'outre-mer* in Aix-en-Provence and at the *Bibliothèque nationale de France* in Paris. An early version was presented at the 51st Annual Meeting of the Society for French Historical Studies at Stanford University in March 2005. The author thanks Bertrand Taithe, Pascal Venier, Robert Aldrich, Laurence Brown and the anonymous reviewers for the *Social History of Alcohol and Drugs: An Interdisciplinary Journal* for their comments. He also thanks W. Scott Haine and Kolleen Guy for their encouragement, and the Arts and Humanities Research Council for their generous financial assistance. **All translations are by the author.**

2. See, for instance, E. Peters, "What the Taste Test Showed: Alcohol and Politics in French Vietnam," *Social History of Alcohol and Drugs: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 19 (2004): 94-110; E. Peters, "Taste, Taxes, and Technologies: Industrializing Rice Alcohol in Northern Vietnam, 1902-1913," *French Historical Studies* 27, no. 3 (2004): 569-600; B. Kadel, "The Pub and the Irish Nation," *Social History of Alcohol and Drugs: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 18, (2003): 69-84.

3. N. Z. Davis, *The Return of Martin Guerre* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983), 4.

4. For such an approach see H. Isnard, *La Vigne en Algérie: étude géographique* 2 vols. (Gap: Ophrys, 1954).

5. Leakey and Co. advertising materials, Spring and Summer 1905. *Archives nationales, section d'outre-mer*, Aix-en-Provence, France. *Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie*, série O (affaires économiques): 1, O, 289 (hereafter ANSOM, GGA, O).

6. Here, the term "Midi" is used to refer broadly to the wine-growing south of France.

7. Union of Bordeaux Wine Traders to President of Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce, September 19, 1905; Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce to Minister of Commerce, October 28, 1905; Montpellier Chamber of Commerce to Governor General of Algeria, December 11, 1905. ANSOM, GGA, 1, O, 289.

8. *Députés* are the elected members of France's National Assembly. The Gironde is the French *département* in which Bordeaux is located. Charles Chaumet would later serve in various government posts, including Minister of Commerce.

9. November 1905 saw a flurry of correspondence between the Minister of Commerce, Ballande, Chaumet and the Governor General of Algeria. Also, C. Jonnart, "Nos Débouchés Coloniaux," *Bulletin de la Société d'Agriculture du Département de Constantine*, December 1, 1905, 348-51; "The Algerian Wine Excitement," *Ridley's Wine and Spirit Trade Circular*, December 8, 1905, 944-46. ANSOM, GGA, 1, O, 289.

10. *Journal Officiel de la République Française, débats parlementaires*, deuxième séance, November 16, 1905, 3296-3303.

11. *La Dépêche Algérienne*, November 19, 1905; November 21, 1905. ANSOM, GGA, 1, O, 289.

12. *Journal Général de l'Algérie*, November 21, 1905. ANSOM, GGA, 1, O, 289.

13. See especially K. Guy, *When Champagne Became French: Wine and the Making of a National Identity* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

14. For accounts of the spread and impact of Phylloxera in France see L. Loubère, *The Red and the White: A History of Wine in France and Italy in the Nineteenth Century* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), 154-80; L. Loubère, *Radicalism in Mediterranean France: Its Rise and Decline, 1871-1921* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974), 96-114; T.

Unwin, *An Historical Geography of Viticulture and the Wine Trade* (London: Routledge, 1991), 283-96.

15. Loubère, *The Red and the White*, 154-55.
16. H. Isnard, "Vigne et colonisation en Algérie," *Annales économies, sociétés, civilisations* 3, (1947): 289.
17. Cited in F. Braudel, *L'Identité de la France* (1986; Paris: Flammarion, 2000), 726.
18. Loubère, *The Red and the White*, 156-57.
19. *Ibid.*, 161-64.
20. Isnard, "Vigne et colonisation en Algérie," 289.
21. On the refinement of taste in the nineteenth century see J. P. Aron, *Le Mangeur du dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1973); on foreign wine in nineteenth century Paris J. P. Aron, *Essai sur la sensibilité alimentaire à Paris au dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), 66-80; on the banalization of alcohol consumption D. Nourrisson, *Le Buveur du dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990).
22. See K. Guy, "Terroir, Algeria, and Modern Memory," unpublished paper, University of Texas San Antonio, 2005.
23. See P. Prestwich, *Drink and the Politics of Social Reform: Antialcoholism in France since 1870* (Palo Alto: Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1988).
24. B. Latour, *The Pasteurization of France*, trans. A. Sheridan and J. Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988). On technologies of testing, see C. Hamlin, *A Science of Impurity: Water Analysis in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 297-305.
25. Unwin, *An Historical Geography of Viticulture*, 295.
26. K. Cross, "The Evolution of Colonial Agriculture: The Creation of the Algerian 'Vignoble,' 1870-1892," *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* 16 (1992): 65.
27. Loubère, *The Red and the White*, 291-92.
28. *Ibid.*, 291-320.
29. Cross, "The Evolution of Colonial Agriculture," 66.
30. Isnard, *La Vigne en Algérie: étude géographique tome II* (Gap: Ophrys, 1954), 396.
31. On the *révolte du Midi* see J. Sagnès, *Le Midi rouge, mythe et réalité* (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1982), 215-57; P. Guidoni, *La Cité Rouge: le socialisme à Narbonne, 1871-1921* (Toulouse: Privat, 1979); R. Magraw, *France 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century* (London: Fontana, 1983), 345-47; Loubère, *The Red and the White*, 305-9; L. Frader, "Grapes of Wrath: Vineyard Workers, Labor Unions and Strike Activity in the Aude, 1860-1913" in *Class Conflict and Collective Action*, ed. L. Tilly and C. Tilly (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981), 185-206. More generally, see G. Garrier, *Histoire sociale et culturelle du vin* (Paris: Bordas, 1995); H. Johnson, *The Story of Wine* (London: Mitchell Beazley, 1989).
32. Magraw, *The Bourgeois Century*, 345-47; L. Loubère, J. Sagnès, L. Frader and R. Pech, eds., *The Vine Remembers: French Vignerons Recall Their Past* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 137-52.
33. See P. Ory, "La Gastronomie" and G. Durand, "La Vigne et le Vin" in *Les lieux de mémoire tome III: les France* ed. P. Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 3711-41 ; 3743-69.
34. Braudel, *L'Identité de la France*, 705.
35. Bachelard, *La Terre et les rêveries du repos* (Paris: Corti, 1948), 329; R. Barthes, *Mythologies* (1957; repr., Paris: Seuil, 1970), 74-77.
36. Barthes, *Mythologies*, 74-76.
37. M. de Certeau, P. Mayol and L. Giard, *L'Invention du quotidien tome II: habiter, cuisinier* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 122-43.
38. See E. Renan "What is a Nation" in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. G. Eley and R. Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 39-55.
39. G. Roupnel, *Histoire de la campagne française* (Paris: Grasset, 1932), 239-49.
40. L. Febvre, "Vignes, Vins et Vignerons," *Annales économies, sociétés, civilisations* 3 (1947): 283.
41. For a recent challenge to this idea see D. Lefeuve, *Chère Algérie: la France et sa colonie*

1930-1962 (2002, repr. Paris: Flammarion, 2005).

42. Barthes, *Mythologies*, 77.

43. G. Noiriél, *Le Creuset français: histoire de l'immigration dix-neuvième-vingtième siècles* (Paris: Seuil, 1988); see, for instance, E. Apter, "French colonial studies and post-colonial theory," *Substance* 24, (1995).

44. See E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1976), 303-38; A. Prost, *Republican Identities in War and Peace* (Oxford: Berg, 2002).

45. J. Strachan, "Romance, Religion and the Republic: Bruno's *Le Tour de la France par deux enfants*," *French History* 18, no. 1 (2004): 96-118.

46. *Journal Officiel de la République Française, débats parlementaires*, deuxième séance, November 16, 1905, 3298-3300.

47. See J. Michelet, *Le Peuple* (Paris: Comptoirs des Imprimeurs Unis, 1846); P. Vidal de la Blache, *Tableau de la géographie de la France* (Paris: Hachette, 1903); Braudel, *L'Identité de la France*. On Braudel in Algeria see F. Braudel, "Personal Testimony," *Journal of Modern History* 44, no. 4 (1972): 448-67; O. Carlier, "Braudel avant Braudel? Les années algériennes (1923-1932)," *Insaniyat*, 19-20 (2003): 143-65; P. Daix, *Braudel* (Paris: Flammarion, 1995); E. Paris, *La Genèse intellectuelle de l'œuvre de Fernand Braudel: La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II (1923-1947)* (Athens: Institut de recherches néohelléniques, 1999).

48. Guy, "Terroir, Algeria, and Modern Memory."

49. Barthes, *Mythologies*, 74.

50. Bachelard, *La Terre et les rêveries du repos*, 323-32.

51. R. Dion, *Histoire de la vigne et du vin en France des origines au dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), 2.

52. Guy, "Terroir, Algeria, and Modern Memory." See also J. Y. Guiomar, "Le 'Tableau de la géographie de la France' de Vidal de la Blache" in *Les lieux de mémoire tome I: la République* ed. P. Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 1073-98.

53. Braudel seems to advocate such an approach in his introductory note to Isnard, "Vigne et colonisation en Algérie," 288.

54. Braudel, *L'Identité de la France*, 711.

55. C. R. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine tome II: 1871-1954* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), 109.

56. Isnard, "Vigne et colonisation en Algérie," 290.

57. *Ibid.*, 300.

58. Cross, "The Evolution of Colonial Agriculture," 60-61.

59. *Ibid.*, 63-64.

60. *Ibid.*, 68-70.

61. On the *Banque de l'Algérie* and *Crédit Foncier* see H. Bonin, *Un Outre-mer bancaire méditerranéen: histoire du Crédit Foncier d'Algérie et de Tunisie, 1880-1997* (Saint-Denis: Publications de la Société française d'histoire d'outre-mer, 2004); M. L. Gharbi, *Crédit et discrédit de la Banque d'Algérie, seconde moitié du dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005).

62. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 108-10.

63. *Ibid.*, 112-13.

64. R. Dejeron, *Les Vignes et les vins de l'Algérie* (Paris: Librairie Agricole de la Maison Rustique, 1883), 344-56.

65. S. Le Roux, *Traité de la vigne et du vin en Algérie et en Tunisie* (Blida: Mauguin, 1894), 367-70.

66. X. Yacono, *Histoire de l'Algérie de la fin de la Régence turque à l'insurrection de 1954* (Versailles: Atlanthrope, 1993), 249; Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 109-10.

67. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 111.

68. Yacono, *Histoire de l'Algérie*, 249.

69. Isnard, *La Vigne en Algérie*, 383-87, 396.

70. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 114.

71. Cross, "The Evolution of Colonial Agriculture," 68-70.

72. *Syndicat Commercial Algérien* to Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 1902. ANSOM, GGA, 1, O, 290.
73. Carcassonne Chamber of Commerce to Minister of Commerce, 1899; Algiers Chamber of Commerce, séance extraordinaire, August 23, 1899. ANSOM, GGA, 1, O, 290.
74. H. Langlois to Director General of Customs, Paris, 1 April 1899. ANSOM, GGA, 1, O, 290.
75. Various correspondence, summer 1902. ANSOM, GGA, 1, O, 290.
76. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 111.
77. *Ibid.*, 110-11.
78. Isnard, *La Vigne en Algérie*, 396-98.
79. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 114.
80. Isnard, *La Vigne en Algérie*, 398-401.
81. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 115-16.
82. *Ibid.*, 116.
83. For this account of Lucien Camus work as a cellarman see O. Todd, *Albert Camus: une vie* (1996 repr. Paris: Gallimard, 1999), 17-31.
84. On the fraught relationship see C. A. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine tome I: 1827-1871* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 388-500; Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 9-68; L. Rinn, *L'Algérie assimilée: étude sur la constitution et le reorganisation de l'Algérie (par un chef de bureau arabe)* (Paris: Challamel Aîné, 1871); F. Leblanc de Prébois, *Situation de l'Algérie depuis le 4 Septembre 1870* (Paris: Challamel Aîné, 1875).
85. J. Vavasseur-Desperriers, *République et Liberté: Charles Jonnart, une conscience républicaine (1857-1927)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 1996), 142.
86. See L. Faissolle, "Un Illustre Gourayen: Charles Jonnart," *L'Algérieniste* 79 (1997) : 39-46 ; *Ibid.*, 80 (1997), 54-60.
87. Vavasseur-Desperriers, *République et Liberté: Charles Jonnart*, 136.
88. Various correspondence, 1902-1905. ANSOM, GGA, 1, O, 288.
89. Vavasseur-Desperriers, *République et Liberté: Charles Jonnart*, 137-38.
90. See Faissolle, "Un Illustre Gourayen: Charles Jonnart." For the history of the Duplex association see Isnard, *La Vigne en Algérie*, 389-96.
91. *The Times*, November 6, 1907, 9; Leakey to Office of the Governor General of Algeria in Paris, December 23, 1907; Office of the Governor General of Algeria in Paris to Governor General of Algeria, January 24, 1908. ANSOM, GGA, 1, 0, 289.
92. *The Times*, May 25, 1907, 4.
93. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 108.
94. Isnard, "Vigne et colonisation en Algérie," 295.
95. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, 107.
96. See especially P. Birebent, "Dans les vignes de mon père," *L'Algérieniste* 107 (2004) : 77-87; E. Scotti, "Petite histoire du vignoble en Algérie," *L'Algérieniste* 38 (1987) : 22-33.